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INTRODUCTION
The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
between the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU) is the most
ambitious bilateral trade agreement of all time.2 Although average tariff
levels between the two partners are relatively low, various non-tariff barriers (NTBs)—often in the form of domestic regulations—continue to
create obstacles for transatlantic investors.3 The TTIP negotiations will
focus on reducing NTB costs and increasing investor protection with
the addition of a controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

Juris Doctor Candidate, American University-Washington College of Law, 2014.
Countries and Regions: United States, EUROPEAN COMMISSION DICTORATE GENERAL
FOR TRADE, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/unitedstates/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
3
See Joseph Francois et al., Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and
Investment, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (MAR. 2013) AT 1, available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf.
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mechanism that allows foreign investors to sue host states for alleged
breaches of the treaty’s substantive rules through private arbitration.4
NGOs and government officials from the EU and U.S. have expressed
concern regarding investor-state arbitration under TTIP including the
potential for increased litigation and the compromise of public policy.5
As a result, opposition toward investor-state arbitration may have a detrimental effect on negotiations due to the intense political scrutiny. The
European Commission (“EC” or “Commission”) has faced a significant
amount of pressure from public interest groups and recently announced
it would hold public consultations on the proposed EU text of TTIP’s
ISDS mechanism.6
This article argues that critics’ fears are exaggerated and an ISDS
mechanism within TTIP would not result in increased disputes or
compromised public policy. By exploring how past agreements and the
increase of investor-state arbitration, provide the foundation for these
concerns, this Article explains how critics fail to consider the U.S. and
EU’s extensive efforts to limit foreign investor protection. Additionally,
the aim is to assess the unique characteristic of the US-EU partnership and how the existing investment relationship decreases the risk
of increased investor-state arbitration under TTIP. The Article will
also explore justification for the ISDS mechanism within agreements
between developed countries and elaborate on additional steps the U.S.
and EU could take to suppress remaining fears surrounding an increase
in investor-state arbitration. If installed correctly, the TTIP ISDS mechanism would increase transatlantic investment by instilling confidence
and reducing risk for foreign investors without forcing countries to alter
public policy or national laws that protect their citizens.

Glyn Moody, EU Mandate For TAFTA Leaked: Includes Investor-State Dispute
Resolution For Intellectual Monopolies, TECH DIRT BLOG (MAY 31, 2013), available at
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130530/12171523255/eu-mandate-tafta-leakedincludes-investor-state-dispute-resolution-intellectual-monopolies.shtml.
5
European Commission Faces Serious Debate Over TTIP Investment Rules, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Oct. 18, 2013), https://wtonewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvu
ser&view=login&return=aHR0cHM6Ly93dG9uZXdzc3RhbmQuY29tL2NvbXBv
bmVudC9vcHRpb24sY29tX3Bwdi9JdGVtaWQsNDQ1L2lkLDI0NTAxNjMv.
6
Press Release, Commission to Consult European Public On Provisions in EUUS Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, European
Commission (Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.
cfm?id=1015.
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I. The Growth of the ISDS Mechanism and Growing Concern of
Litigation and Corporate Power
ISDS is a system that allows private investors to sue a host state for
the alleged violation of an investment treaty concluded between the host
state and the investor’s country of origin. These ISDS rules are included
in most of the nearly 3,000 international investment agreements (IIA)7
and are unique in that they often allow investors to file claims with international arbitration tribunals without initiating proceedings before a
national court.8 ISDS rules are included in all of the bilateral investment
treaties (BIT) between new EU Member States and the U.S and mentioned in the EC’s negotiating mandate as an element the Commission
intends to include within the TTIP.9 The US 2012 Model BIT, a blueprint for US investment negotiations, also contains extensive rules on
investment protection and arbitration.10
Investor-state arbitration by an independent tribunal was originally
created to protect companies from weak court systems in developing
countries.11 However, the increased practice between global leaders
has allowed corporations to gain more power in challenging hoststate regulations, even in developed states. Over the last two decades,
International investment agreements can be bilateral or involve more parties.
Investment-related clauses can also be included in broader agreements, notably free
trade agreements.
8
David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor – State Dispute Settlement: A
Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (2012) at 10, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf (presenting the results of a survey of more than
1,600 investment treaties and conclude that more than 90% of them provide for
investor-state dispute settlement. In some of them, ISDS only relates to disputes over
expropriation).
9
See EU Draft Text On ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach,
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2013) [hereinafter EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains
Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach], http://insidetrade.com/Inside-TradeGeneral/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/eu-draft-text-on-isds-containssimilarities-differences-to-us-approach/menu-id-896.html.
10
SHAYERAH AKHTAR AND MARTIN WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 43052, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2013) at 8, 11
[hereinafter U.S. International Investment Agreements].
11
Christoph Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, UNIV.VIENNA
INT’L L.J. 15, 15-16 (2006) available at www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/85_
cspubl_86.pdf (discussing the role of private investment in economic development and
the importance of developing countries revising attitudes towards FDI).
7
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investor-state arbitration has increased from a few dozen cases in 1992
to 514 cases by the end of 2012.12 In 2012, the number of known treatybased ISDS cases filed under IIAs grew by nearly sixty cases.13 This
constitutes the highest number of known treaty-based disputes ever filed
in one year.14
While the number of cases brought to arbitration is small compared
to the thousands of investments that benefit both the host countries
and companies investing in them, recent cases brought by investors
against states have given rise to strong public concern. Recent claims
have challenged the impact of policies such as environmental and labor
regulations, emergency economic measures related to the 2008-2009
economic crisis, and cultural protection laws, among others. The main
concern is that the current investment protection rules may be abused to
prevent countries from making legitimate policy choices.
Among the cases that have caught the most public attention are the
on-going cases Vattenfall v. Germany and Philip Morris v. Australia.15
Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, brought a claim against the
German government (under the Energy Charter Treaty) after its decision in 2011 to speed up the phase-out of nuclear power generation.16
Philip Morris has also challenged the government of Australia for its
decision to ban brand names on cigarette packs (the ‘plain packaging’ measure) for reasons of public health.17 These cases have not yet
been decided and it is impossible to gauge whether either case will be
successful. However, it is important to note that neither Germany nor
Recent Developments In Investor State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD INT’L
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE, (2013) at 1 [hereinafter UNCTAD
Recent Developments In ISDS], available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf (The number of known treaty-based ISDS cases filed under
international investment agreements grew by at least 58 in 2012.).
13
Id. at 1.
14
Id. at 2-3 (noting that of the 58 new cases, 37 were filed by investors from
developed countries.)
15
Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany (ICSID Case
No. ARB/12/12) [hereinafter Vattenfall] and Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The
Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12. [hereinafter Philip
Morris].
16
See id.; see also The Thirteenth Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (13.
AtGAndG v. 31.07.2011, BGBl I S. 1704 (No. 43)) (beginning on August 6, 2011).
17
See Philip Morris, supra note 15 (arguing that warning labels on cigarette packs
and plain packaging prevent it from effectively displaying its trade mark, causing a
substantial loss of market share).
12
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Australia have been influenced or forced to make any changes to their
policies as a result of the cases brought by the investors.
Fears of increased disputes and compromised public policy have
compelled countless nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to speak
out against the TTIP agreement and other IIAs that include investment
protection mechanisms.18 Critics argue that the TTIP agreement would
empower EU and U.S. corporations “to engage in litigious wars of attrition to limit the power of governments on both sides of the Atlantic.”19
They claim that the tremendous volume of investment between the EU
and U.S. and their investors’, who already frequently use investor-state
arbitration, will inevitably lead to an exorbitant increase in arbitration
under TTIP.20
It is true that U.S. and EU investors are among the most frequent
users of the dispute settlement procedures and account for a growing

See e.g., Investment Rights Stifle Democracy, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY
(last updated Apr. 26, 2011), http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2011/04/investmentrights-stifle-democracy; Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher Byrnes, Philip Morris
v. Uruguay: Will investor-State arbitration send restrictions on tobacco marketing
up in smoke?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Jul. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Porterfield,
Byrnes], available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-v-uruguaywill-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/.;
Letter from Senator Maralyn Chase and Rep. Sharon Treat to Ambassador Ron Kirk
(Jul. 5, 2012) (enclosing letter signed by state legislators from all 50 states and Puerto
Rico stating strong opposition to the inclusion of ISDS provisions in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP)); Letter from Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue to Ambassador Ron
Kirk (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/TACD-TAFTAletter-3-5-13.pdf (expressing concern for any deal that dismantles existing EU and
US consumer protection); Kanaga Raja, EU-US Deal Could Unleash a “Corporate
Litigation Boom”, THIRD WORLD ECONOMICS (Jun. 2013), http://twnside.org.sg/title2/
twe/2013/547/5.htm; A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights: Investor Privileges
in EU-US Trade Deal Threaten Public Interest and Democracy, CORPORATE EUROPE
OBSERVATORY (Oct. 2013), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/
download/ttipinvestment-oct2013.pdf (“Investor-state dispute settlement under the
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European
Union and the United States would empower EU- and US-based corporations to
engage in litigious wars of attrition to limit the power of governments on both sides of
the Atlantic”).
19
A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights: Investor Privileges in the EU-US Trade
Deal Threaten Public Interest and Democracy, CORP. EUROPE OBSERVATORY (Oct.
2013) at 3, available at http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
transatlantic-corporate-bill-of-rights-oct13.pdf.
20
Id. at 1.
18
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number of cases. Of the 514 known disputes, U.S. investors have filed
24% (123) of all cases while EU investors have filed 40%.21 Of the 52
total cases initiated in 2012, EU investors were behind 60% of all initiations, while U.S. investors accounted for 7.7%.22 Despite these arguments access to private investor-state arbitration under TTIP does not
automatically imply that U.S. and EU investors will increase the use of
investor-state arbitration or if they do, be successful.
II. Unfounded Fear of Increase in Investor Disputes and Corporate
Control In EU and U.S.
The criticism aimed at the TTIP’s ISDS mechanism fails to consider significant policy revisions made by the U.S. and EU to improve
their individual ISDS mechanisms under existing BITs with other
countries and limit foreign investor protection. These accusations are
also unsupported by the low number of claims brought under existing
BITs between U.S. and individual EU Member states and the low rate
of success of claims brought against good governance countries such as
Germany, France, the UK, and the U.S.
A. Less Favorable Post-NAFTA Investment Agreements
Interest groups that have expressed criticism of investor-state arbitration under TTIP frequently cite the 60 disputes filed under NAFTA’s
Chapter 11 to justify accusations that the same will result under the
transatlantic agreement.23 However, those critics fail to consider the significant changes the U.S. and EU have made in recent years in response
to the number of disputes created under NAFTA.
The U.S.’s 2004 Model BIT is an example of these efforts, which
developed from concerns that foreign investor protections were too
broad under NAFTA and therefore foreign investors received more
favorable treatment under the agreement than U.S. investors received
UNCTAD RECENT DEV. IN ISDS, supra note 12 at 4 (explaining that the number of
known treaty-based ISDS cases filed under international investment agreements grew
by at least 58 in 2012.).
22
Factsheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct.
3, 2013) at 5, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/doc/2013/october/
tradoc_151791.pdf.
23
Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and Other
U.S. ‘Trade’ Deals, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.
21
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under U.S. law.24 The 2004 Model contains several additions including a narrower definition of investment covered under the agreement,
a narrower minimum standard of treatment, more detailed provisions
on investor-state arbitration, provisions to enhance the transparency of
national laws and proceedings, as well as language addressing environmental and labor standards.25 The 2004 Model BIT was used as the
basis for the U.S.’s BITs with Uruguay and Rwanda and no investorstate dispute claims have risen under those two agreements.26 It is also
relevant to note that Philip Morris, a U.S. company, decided to bring a
claim against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT because the
U.S. BIT did not provide enough investor protection.27
Shortly after taking office in 2009, the Obama Administration suspended ongoing BIT negotiations to further review the scope of investor protection and ensure the Model BIT “was consistent with public
interest and the Administration’s overall economic agenda.”28 The 2012
Model BIT added new transparency requirements requiring parties to
publish proposed regulations, explain their purpose and rationale, allow
public comments, and address such comments when adopting the final
regulations.29 These new provisions could forestall a percentage of
investor-state arbitrations, since the new provisions give investors an
opportunity to discuss the effects of regulatory amendments and host
states a chance to reevaluate proposed changes before final promulgation. The 2012 Model also expands the scope of labor and environmental obligations by an affirmative responsibility on parties to ensure they
do not waive or derogate from domestic or labor laws.30 Unless the U.S.
suddenly reverses course in its treaty negotiating, the terms of the TTIP

U.S. International Investment Agreements, supra note 10 at 9.
Id.
26
Id.; see also Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases,
UNCTAD, [hereinafter UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database], http://iiadbcases.
unctad.org (including information on known treaty-based ISDS cases that are pending
or concluded) (last visited on Jan. 20, 2014).
27
PORTERFIELD, BYRNES, supra note 18.
28
U.S. International Investment Agreements, supra note 10 at 9.
29
2012 MODEL U.S. BILATERAL INV. TREATY, UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
art. 10-11 [hereinafter 2012 Model U.S. BIT] (adopted on Apr. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.
pdf.
30
See id. art. 13 (noting that the 2004 model contained a more aspirational provision,
calling only for the parties to “strive to ensure”).
24
25
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investment chapter are likely to be less favorable to European investors
than already-existing BITs.
The Commission is also working to improve investment dispute provisions by clarifying investment protection rules and improving how the
dispute settlement system operates.31 These improvements are intended
to address concerns raised that investment protection rules may negatively impact states’ rights to regulate.32 The Commission has stated that
all EU FTAs will confirm the parties’ “right to regulate and to pursue
legitimate public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety, and the promotion and protection of cultural diversity.”33 Additionally, the EU has introduced a code of conduct
in order to deal with conflicts of interests among arbitrators that are
serving on tribunals.34
The EU and the U.S. are also committed to a more transparent arbitration system and are exploring the creation of an appellate mechanism.
It was reported that the EC’s June 2012 draft text included transparency
provisions similar to those included in the Obama Administration’s 2012
Model that require parties’ legal submissions be made public, hearings
be open to the public, and non-disputing parties be allowed to submit
amicus briefs.35
The EU’s June 2012 draft text also included language describing a
possible appellate mechanism for private arbitration under the agreement.36 While no provisions requiring the consideration of an appellate
mechanism are included in the U.S. model BIT, U.S. FTAs with Korea,
Colombia and Panama include an annex to the investment chapter stating that the “parties will consider establishing such a mechanism for
investor-state disputes three years after the FTA enters into force.”37

Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU Agreements,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2 (Nov. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Investment Protection and ISDS
in EU Agreements], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/
tradoc_151916.pdf (summarizing the importance of investment agreements and steps
taken to improve the ISDS mechanism within EU investment agreements).
32
See id. at 1.
33
See id. at 7.
34
See id. at 9.
35
EU Draft Text on ISDS Contains Similarities, Differences To U.S. Approach,
supra note.
36
Id.
37
Id.
31
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Experts have also reported that a revised version of the European
Commission’s draft mandate includes further provisions to guard against
frivolous legal claims, bringing the EU more closely in line with U.S.
positions in past FTAs and investment treaties.38 Individual EU member-state BITs have traditionally excluded these disposal mechanisms
but it is similar to what the EU recently proposed during the CETA
negotiations with Canada.39 These frivolous claim provisions closely
reflect text in the US Trade Act of 2002.40 Mechanisms reflecting this
principle were also included in subsequent free trade deals such as the
U.S-Morocco and U.S.-Korea FTAs, and a number of U.S. BITs.41 In
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, the ability for an arbitral tribunal to evaluate
whether a claim is frivolous is also part of the procedure through which
a state may preliminarily object to a complainant’s claim on the basis
that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider it.42
B. Existing Investment Relationship Between U.S.
and EU Members
Perhaps the most convincing argument against the risk of increased
disputes and arbitration is the current investment relationship between
the U.S. and individual EU member countries. The U.S. currently has
BITs with eight EU members43 in former transition economies dating
back to the early and mid-1990s.44 There have been no claims brought
against the U.S. under those treaties.45 There have been eleven claims
Stuart Trew, Revised EU Mandate Seeks To Prevent ‘Frivolous’ Investor-State
Claims, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Revised Mandate Seeks To
Prevent Frivolous Claims], http://wtonewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvuser
&view=login&return=aHR0cDovL3d0b25ld3NzdGFuZC5jb20vY29tcG9uZW50
L29wdGlvbixjb21fcHB2L0l0ZW1pZCw0NDYvaWQsMjQzNTM4OS8=.
39
See id.
40
U.S. Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. §2102(b)(3)(G)(i) (2002) (stating
that investment measures should include “meaningful procedures for resolving
investment disputes,” while also including “mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims
and to deter the filing of frivolous claims”).
41
Revised Mandate Seeks To Prevent Frivolous Claims, supra note 38.
42
2012 U.S MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., art. 28.
43
Bulgaria (1994); Croatia (1992); Czech Republic (1992); Estonia (1997); Lativia
(1996); Lithuania (2001); Poland (1994); Romania (1994).
44
United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://
www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
45
UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
38
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against EU members by U.S investors—however, five of those claims
were brought before the responding countries became members of the
EU.46 Also, of the claims with known results, no tribunal awarded in
favor of the U.S. investor47 and no claims were brought in 2012 and
2013.48
When assessing the likelihood of increased litigation against developed EU members and the U.S., the track record for investor-state
arbitration shows that the proportion of claims against “good governance” countries like Germany, France, and U.S. are extremely low.49
A standard created by the World Bank, ‘good governance’ is associated
with democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, the rule of law,
and efficient public services.50 Countries, like the U.S. and developed
economies within the EU, possess a low track record for investor-state
arbitration cases brought against them and possess a very high success
rate in the small number of claims that are brought.51 The U.S. has never
lost an investor-state claim.52 Also, the U.S. has been party to agreements providing for investor-state arbitration since the early 1980’s,
which includes about forty BITs and FTAs with about twenty-five more
states.53 The only agreement under which the U.S. has ever been sued in
investor-state arbitration, and the only claimants (with one exception)
has been to Canada.54 There have been no other claims under any other
investment agreement.55
C. Cost
Cost also provides a disincentive for bringing investor-state claims.
Having more investors does not mean more claims if investors decide
Id. (counting claims brought against Poland in 1996; Czech Republic in 1999,
Estonia in 1999; Romania in 2001 and 2005).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Mark Kantor, Comment on USCIB on Investor-State in the TPP, INT’L ECON. L.
AND POLICY BLOG (May 11, 2013), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/05/
uscib-on-investor-state-in-the-tpp.html.
50
What is Governance, THE WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx#home (last visited on Jan. 20, 2014).
51
UNCTAD Treaty-Based ISDS Database, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined..
52
INT’L ECON. L. AND POLICY BLOG, supra note 49
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
46
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they are no more likely to succeed than those that have already sued the
U.S. or an EU member state.56 The average cost of arbitration is $8 million per party, approximately 82 percent of which is legal fees and most
take several years to conclude.57 This is partly due to the fact that many
legal issues remain unsettled, meaning extensive resources must be used
to develop a legal position by closely studying previous arbitral awards.
Under the ICSID rules, each member of the arbitral panel can claim
a daily fee of $3,000 plus expenses, while billing rates for arbitration
lawyers run up to $1,000 per hour.58 The EU’s initiative to prevent frivolous claims by making the losing party pay costs will also contribute to
investors’ hesitation in bringing frivolous claims.59
Critics of TTIP and the ISDS mechanism have failed to consider the
changes made within the modern trading system and the low record of
disputes against the U.S. and leading EU member states. The additional
measures taken by the U.S. and EU to revise investor policy as well as
the incredible track record of success of the U.S. and EU good governance countries in investor-state claims will prevent companies from
bringing a surge of claims against the U.S. or EU.
III. Justification for Investor-State Arbitration Within
Developed Countries
The purpose of IIAs is to encourage inflows of capital and technology needed for economic growth by reducing legal and political risk.60
Especially in developing countries, domestic resources are not enough
to generate the needed growth to improve the lives of their people and

See GAVIN THOMPSON, LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, SN/EP/6777, INVESTORSTATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
1 (2013) [HEREINAFTER G. THOMPSON], available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/
publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06777/investorstate-dispute-settlement-isdsand-the-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip (responding to common
questions about investor-state dispute settlement provisions).
57
See id. at 4.
58
See id.
59
Investment Protection and ISDS in EU Agreements, supra note 31, at 8.
60
Peter H. Chase, The United States, European Union, and International Investment,
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC
ECONOMY BLOG (Jul. 2011) 1 2 [hereinafter Peter Chase], http://www.gmfus.org/wpcontent/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/chase_us_eu_intlinvestment_jul111.pdf (summarizing
the importance of international investment treaties within developing countries).
56
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foreign capital is required as well.61 These countries recognize, however, that foreigners may be wary of putting money into countries about
which they know little and will do so only if they get a high enough rate
of return to cover the perceived risks.62 Investment agreements provide
guarantees to help assuage investor’s concerns and reduce the need for
other inducements to attract foreign capital.
It is easy for one to assume that developed countries do not need further investor protection to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by
transnational companies. However, UNCTAD’s 2013 World Investment
Report states that for the first time ever, developing economies absorbed
more FDI in 2012 than developed countries, accounting for 52 percent
of global FDI flows.63 FDI inflows to developed economies declined by
32 percent to $561 billion—a level last seen almost 10 years ago.64 The
EU alone accounted for almost two thirds of the global FDI decline.65
At the same time, FDI outflows from developed countries also dropped
to close to 2009 levels.66 UNCTAD forecasts FDI in 2013 to remain
close to the 2012 level, with an upper range of $1.45 trillion—a level
comparable to the pre-crisis average of 2005-2007.67 The TTIP and its
ISDS mechanism will contribute to economic recovery within the EU
and U.S. by removing low barriers to trade and creating a more confident and predictable investing environment.
Although investors will be able to go to domestic courts within the
U.S. and EU to enforce their legal rights under TTIP (and will continue
to do so in most cases), the ISDS mechanism provides three purposes
that domestic courts cannot. It addresses the international obligations of
the host government under the agreement when steps taken legally under
domestic law allegedly violate the treaty promises on discrimination,
See id. at 2 (noting developing countries’ need for foreign direct investment).
See id. (highlighting the need for incentives and investment protection for
developing countries in order to attract foreign investment).
63
World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2013) at 30 [hereinafter 2013 World
Investment Report], available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&es
rc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fvi.unctad.
org%2Fdigital-library%2F%3Ftask%3Ddl_doc%26doc_name%3D873-world-inves
t&ei=MlreUqHUIKSvsQT3lYH4Bg&usg=AFQjCNEa5FFCKIghgVaxM_jtxxrF9xuOQ&bvm=bv.59568121,d.cWc.
64
Id. at 13.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 9.
67
Id. at 12.
61
62
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expropriation, or obstruction of transfer.68 It ensures a neutral venue
to hear the complaint when domestic courts may have difficulty dealing with differences between domestic and international obligation.69
Last but not least, it depoliticizes the conflict, so the government of the
investor does not have to decide whether to sue the host country, and
investors need not depend on their own governments to undertake what
is often a diplomatically sensitive step to protect their investments.70
Despite the overall quality of the U.S. and EU court systems, it is not
unreasonable for a foreign investor from either location to be concerned
about the potential for corruption and discrimination in regulatory decisions. The existence of investor-state arbitration gives foreign investors
more confidence than an independent impartial tribunal that is available
to them if required for such a rare situation.
As for U.S. investors going abroad, fear that courts within developed
economies like the UK, France, and Germany may be unjustified, but
that is not true for all 28 EU-member states. For transitioning economies within the EU—with weaker judicial and regulatory systems and a
higher level of corruption and incompetence—investor-state arbitration
offers a more adequate alternative to local courts.71 This is also one reason why developed states in the EU are so reluctant to give up their own
intra-EU BITs with weaker EU-member economies despite pressure to
do so from the Commission.72
It is also legitimate for foreigners to be concerned about whether
independent and impartial regulatory and judicial treatment is always
available in the U.S. For example, Transparency International-USA
noted this when the TI 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index was released:
“[t]he United States ranks 19th in this year’s CPI, lower than many of

Peter Chase, supra note 60, at 3-4.
Id.
70
Peter Chase, supra note 60, at 4.
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See Transition Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
ib/2000/110300.htm (listing Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine as transitioning
economies within the EU).
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or First Victims of EU Investment Policy, COLLEGE OF EUROPE, 17 (2012), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/39283/1/researchpaper_2_2012_schicho_final.pdf (describing
reluctance by Member States to give up their intra-EU BITs with other EU members).
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its partners in the OECD.”73 The U.S. ranking confirms that Americans
believe there are continued transparency and corruption issues in local,
state, and national government institutions and processes.74 Claudia
Dumas, President and CEO of Transparency International—USA also
adds, “while the United States has a commendable record of enforcing
its anti-bribery laws, greater efforts must be made to increase transparency and accountability in U.S. governance. This includes strengthening
the ability of prosecutors to pursue undisclosed conflicts of interest by
government officials.”75
Litigation will continue to be brought in U.S. courts because of the
favorable investor law such as the Administrative Procedures Act and
Tucker Acts while U.S. investors will predominantly use EU member
state local law. However, the ISDS mechanism will provide the adequate protection for investors in special circumstances. ISDS provides
the needed guarantee to companies that their investments will be treated
fairly and on an equal footing with domestic companies.
IV. Further Safeguards and Alternatives
Although the U.S. and EU have taken significant steps to create
a more transparent, fair, and effective ISDS system, challenges and
concerns remain regarding arbitrators’ impartiality and independence,
forum shopping, consistency of arbitral decisions, and a lack of a
review system.76 These challenges have prompted further debate regarding a number of alternatives the U.S. and EU have addressed and may
consider when negotiating the TTIP agreement. These options include
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the creation of an appellate mechanism, tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs, and the
creation of an international investment court.

Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2012), http://www.
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An ADR mechanism, especially evaluative mediation, is increasingly attracting more favorable support in business for reasons such
as cost control, efficiency, confidentiality, preservation of relationship,
informality, and flexibility.77 Evaluative mediation is a right-based form
of ADR where a third-party neutral looks at the disputing parties’ positional briefs and evaluates them objectively in light of her expertise to
predict how they would fare in a legally binding decision or arbitration.78 If mediation reaches an impasse, arbitration can be resorted to
as a fallback with the same person as the mediator and arbitrator or a
different person as the arbitrator as the parties might agree.79 It is also
noteworthy that the settlement rate of investor-state disputes at ICSID
before any final award is rendered is estimated approximately at 30-40
percent.80 Given the high success rate, ISDS by mediation should to be
explored further.
An investment appellate body at the international level could also
enhance the consistency, predictability, and perceived impartiality of
decisions rendered by arbitral tribunals. Consistency of jurisprudence
creates predictability and enhances the legitimacy of the investment
arbitration system.81 Under the current system, however, rulings by a
panel do not set a precedent for future cases, and sometime the decisions
by different panels conflict.82 An appellate mechanism could provide a
more uniform and coherent means for challenging awards of traditional
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the World, 26 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 97 (2008) (noting that attention must be paid to a
mediation type that caters to the accountability of dispute resolvers [state authority or
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a-rethink-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (describing the increase in ADR’s
popularity within ISDS).
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bases.83 There are, of course, challenges to this model, such as the logistics of selecting members, ensuring the timely resolution of disputes
and the need to have a certain number of states participate before the
system would be effective.84 However, mechanisms such as the WTO’s
Appellate Body provide a current model for an effective mechanism in
this respect and a handful of FTAs contain provisions that contemplate
the introduction of an appellate body in the future.85 Although the EU
and U.S. have discussed the idea of establishing an appellate mechanism, neither entity has taken meaningful steps to bring this potential
feature to fruition. This feature in particular, if created, could resolve
a great deal of controversy spurred by NGOs and other critics of TTIP
and its ISDS mechanism.
In addition to the appellate mechanism, UNCTAD suggests tailoring the existing system through individual international investment
agreements to promote consistency.86 This option implies that main
features of the existing system would be preserved and individual countries would apply tailored modifications by altering aspects of the ISDS
system within their new investment agreements.87 Some countries are
already pursuing procedural innovations including: setting time limits
for bringing claims, increasing the contracting parties’ role in interpreting the treaty to avoid legal interpretations that go beyond the original
intent, and establishing a mechanism for consolidation of claims.88 The
U.S. has more transparency in its ISDS mechanism through the 2012
Model BIT and the EU has included a mechanism for an early discharge
of frivolous claims.89 Coupled with the renegotiation of existing treaties
and increasing regional integration, changes like these could clarify and
improve law that is applicable to ISDS.
As the U.S. and the EU move forward with TTIP negotiations, it
is important for both parties to seriously consider creative alternatives
See Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 76 at
12 (outlining advantages to adopting an appellate mechanism for investment disputes).
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because TTIP will be used as a model for future international investment law.
CONCLUSION
Trade between the U.S. and the EU countries now accounts for
almost half of global economic output. The 28 EU-member states are
by far the U.S.’s largest trading partner. If the TTIP comes to fruition, it
will be the biggest trade agreement in history, potentially adding $420
billion per year to the global economy and creating over two million
jobs. Despite the economic need for the TTIP agreement, negotiations
have been slowed by pushback from public groups that express exaggerated fears surrounding the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.
These groups fail to consider the existing trade relationship between the
EU and U.S., the measures each partner put in place to restrict investor protection, and the realistic implications of investor-state dispute
resolution and those measures. If modeled after recent IIAs, the ISDS
mechanism within TTIP will provide investors with added confidence
of adequate protection without forcing countries to alter public policy
or national laws that protect their citizens. The TTIP will remove regulatory hurdles that are now imposed by governments, increase confidence
in a neutral dispute settlement venue, and serve as a model for future
international trade law.

